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THE VALIDITY OF SAN FRANCISCO'S COMMUTER TAX
On August 19, 1968, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed
an ordinance imposing a license tax on all nonresidents employed
in San Francisco.' The ordinance imposes a tax of one percent upon
the gross income earned by the nonresident in the city.2 The dis-
cussion in this note is confined to the validity of the tax itself3 under
the law of municipal home rule in California and the provision for
equal protection in the federal4 and state5 constitutions. The discus-
sion is circumscribed by the basic proposition that the ordinance, as
stated on its face,6 is a revenue-raising measure.
Municipal Home Rule
The fundamental premise of home rule in California is that a
chartered city 7 derives its power to legislate from a direct constitu-
tional grant and, within the framework of the power granted, is an
autonomous political entity. The pertinent constitutional provisions
1 San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance 246-68, Aug. 19, 1968. The preamble
provides in part: "An Ordinance Providing For The Imposition Of License
Fees For The Privilege Of Engaging In Occupations, Trades And Professions
In The City And County Of San Francisco By All Non-Resident Persons
Employed By Others . . . ." The tax imposed by ordinance is popularly
referred to as the "commuter tax". The ordinance will be referred to as the
"commuter tax ordinance" or the "San Francisco ordinance" in the body of
the text.
2 Id. § 2: "license fees shall be measured by one percent (.01) of the
gross receipts of each such person ... ." It is interesting to note the phrase-
ology in reference to "gross receipts". The measure of the tax is wages and
salaries which generally would be termed "gross income".
3 The implementing provisions, which include apportionment, employer
withholding, administration, savings clause and penalties, will not be dis-
cussed. See generally id. §§ 3, 4, 6, 12, 13.
The assumption made by this writer is that should any of these clauses
be invalid, they will be held to be severable. See, e.g., People v. Evans, 249
Cal. App. 2d 254, 57 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1967) (penalty provision in hotel oc-
cupancy tax severable).
4 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5 CAL. CoNsr. art. I, § 21.
6 San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance 246-68, preamble, Aug. 19, 1968.
7 The California constitution provides for three categories of cities;
charter cities, general law cities, and cities created by special legislative
enactment prior to the adoption of the state constitution. See Peppin, Munici-
pal Home Rule in California: 1, 30 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1941). Under the consti-
tution a general law city has the authority to "make and enforce within its
limits all such local, police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in con-
flict with the general laws." CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 11.
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are sections 6 and 8 of article XI, in which chartered cities are given
the power "to make and enforce all laws and regulations in respect to
municipal affairs, subject only to the restrictions and limitations pro-
vided in their several charters .... "8 That the grant of power is to
be exercised only in municipal affairs is emphasized by the further
qualification that "in respect to other matters they [chartered cities]
shall be subject to and controlled by general laws .... ,,9 Section 6
extends to the chartered city the privilege of accepting this grant of
power. Section 8 makes it competent for any city, in its charter, to
limit the privilege thus extended. 0
Once it is determined that a particular subject matter is a munici-
pal affair, municipal legislation on the subject is paramount to that
of the state" and is limited only by the city charter and the Constitu-
tion .12 Conversely, where the subject matter is one of statewide con-
cern, state law is paramount and the charter city is subject to and con-
trolled by the state legislation.' 3 San Francisco, a charter city, has
accepted this autonomy or home rule in municipal affairs.' 4
Municipal Power to Tax
From an early date, the California courts have consistently held
that the direct constitutional grant of home rule confers upon the
charter cities the power of taxation for revenue purposes.' 5 The su-
preme court in Ex parte Braun'6 found this power "too obvious to
merit discussion."' 7  A statement by Mr. Justice Field in an 1878
United States Supreme Court decision 8 is frequently cited by the
California courts as expressing their attitude toward municipal taxa-
tion:
When such a [municipal] corporation is created, the power of tax-
ation is vested in it, as an essential attribute, for all purposes of its
existence, unless its exercise be in express terms prohibited .... A
municipality without the power of taxation would be a body without
life, incapable of acting and serving no useful purpose.' 9
8 CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 6, 8.
9 Id.
10 See West Coast Advertising Co. v. San Francisco, 14 Cal. 2d 516,
522-523, 95 P.2d 138, 142-43 (1939).
"1 E.g., Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 74 P. 780 (1903).
12 E.g., West Coast Advertising Co. v. San Francisco, 14 Cal. 2d 516,
95 P.2d 138 (1939).
'3 E.g., Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942); Ex parte
Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 192 P. 442 (1920).
14 SAN FRANcIsco, CAL., CHARTER § 2 (1932).
15 E.g., Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 74 P. 780 (1903). The general law
city derives its revenue licensing power from a legislative grant. CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 37107. ("The legislative body may license for revenue and regula-
tion .... ).
16 141 Cal. 204, 74 P. 780 (1903).
'7 Id. at 209, 74 P. at 782.
18 United States v. New Orleans, 98 U.S. 381 (1878).
'9 Id. at 393.
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The extent of the constitutional grant of taxing power to Califor-
nia charter cities has been discussed in several cases. West Coast
Advertising Co. v. San Francisco20 involved the limiting effect of the
San Francisco charter on the city's power to levy license taxes. It was
contended that, since the charter expressly provided for licensing for
regulatory purposes,21 it necessarily precluded licensing for revenue
purposes. The supreme court rejected this contention and held that
any power granted by the constitution, and not expressly limited by
the charter, may be exercised by the municipality.22
In Ainsworth v. Bryant,23 the validity of a municipal tax on the
sale of liquor was questioned on the ground that the control, regula-
tion and taxation of alcoholic beverages had been placed exclusively
under the power of the state. An amendment to the constitution
had been adopted in 1932 to provide:
The State of California... shall have the exclusive right and power
to license and regulate the manufacture, sale, purchase, possession and
transportation of intoxicating liquor within the State .... The State
Board of Equalization shall have the exclusive power to license the
manufacture, importation and sale of intoxicating liquors ... and to
collect license fees or occupation taxes on account thereof .... 24
There was no question that, being later in time, the constitutional
provision operated to modify the home rule grant.25 Nevertheless,
the court held that where a matter is removed from the realm of
municipal affairs to one of statewide concern by a constitutional
amendment affecting municipal power to tax for revenue purposes,
the amendment controls only in the express field it covers. The Al-
coholic Beverages Control Act 26 passed by the legislature pursuant to
the 1932 amendment was primarily a regulatory measure. The court
held that no implication would be made from the grant of regulatory
power so as to invade "the plenary power of taxation possessed by a
chartered municipality."2 7
The further problem presented by the grant of taxing power and
the inclusion of two sections dealing with taxes in the state legislation
was disposed by a classification of the taxes. The court defined the
state tax as an excise tax imposed upon the merchant for the privilege
of selling his wares, and the municipal tax as a tax levied on the sale
of the wares and paid by the consumer. The municipal tax was thus
held to be a valid exercise of municipal power of taxation for revenue
purposes.28
20 14 Cal. 2d 516, 95 P.2d 138 (1939).
21 SAN FRAxcisco, CAL., CHARiu § 24 (1932).
22 14 Cal. 2d at 525, 95 P.2d at 144.
23 34 Cal. 2d 465, 211 P.2d 564 (1949).
24 CAL. CoNsT. art. XX, § 22 (emphasis added).
25 Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34 Cal. 2d 465, 472, 211 P.2d 564, 568 (1949).
26 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 23000-23047.
27 Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34 Cal. 2d 465, 473, 211 P.2d 564, 569 (1949)
(emphasis added).
28 Id. at 473, 211 P.2d at 569.
The above cases indicate a judicial acceptance of municipal sov-
ereignty in the area of taxation, predicated upon the constitutional
grant of home rule. The principle from which this broad power of
taxation stems was clearly stated by the supreme court in Ex parte
Braun:29
It is of course true that the local power of taxation, like all other
local powers, must have its origin in a grant by the state, and that
it may at all times be controlled by the sovereign power. But it does
not follow that the legislative department of the state may so control
it. In the absence of constitutional provisions relating to the subject,
the legislative department would have unlimited sway, and could, for
the state, confer, modify, or withdraw the power and prescribe such
regulations as it saw fit for its exercise. The state constitution is,
however, the highest expression of the will of the people of the state,
and so far as it speaks, represents the state....
The power of cities operating under freeholders' charters to raise
money by taxation for municipal purposes does not find its source in
any grant by the legislature .... Such power has been directly
granted by the people of the state by the provisions of the state con-
stitution.30
The doctrine of an "inherent" power of municipal taxation is not a
generally accepted proposition and may be unique to California. 31 It
is beyond the scope of this note to make a comparative analysis of
city tax measures in other states. To be meaningful, such a discussion
would have to include a careful appraisal of the constitutional pro-
visions and legislative measures of the particular state in which each
municipal ordinance was enacted. Under California law, however,
the imposition by San Francisco of a license tax for revenue purposes
is clearly within the city's taxing power.32
Classification of the Commuter Tax
Although the power to levy license taxes for revenue purposes is
beyond dispute,33 the question of whether or not a charter city has the
power to levy an "income tax" has not been before the California
courts. Insofar as the license exacted by the commuter tax is meas-
ured by income, the tax is a percentage of the monetary proceeds of
labor and takes on a characteristic of an "income tax."34 Insofar as it
is directed against a "privilege," it is a "license tax."35
Similar taxing measures have been classified in other jurisdictions
29 141 Cal. 204, 74 P. 780 (1903).
30 Id. at 211-12, 74 P. at 783.
31 Antieau, Municipal Power to Tax-Its Constitutional Limitations, 8
VAxD. L. REV. 698 (1955).
32 E.g., West Coast Advertising Co. v. San Francisco, 14 Cal. 2d 516,
95 P.2d 138 (1939); Franklin v. Peterson, 87 Cal. App. 2d 727, 197 P.2d 788
(1948).
33 See, e.g., West Coast Advertising Co. v. San Francisco, 14 Cal. 2d 516,
95 P.2d 138 (1939).
34 Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420, 429, 214 S.W.2d 248, 253 (1948).
35 Id. at 429, 214 S.W.2d at 254.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20
January 1969] SAN FRANCISCO'S COMMUTER TAX
both as an "income tax" and as a "license tax" in order to sustain their
validity.30 Two questions are raised by this problem of tax classifica-
tion: (1) Does a charter city have the power to levy an "income tax"?
(2) Will the California courts classify the ordinance as an "income tax"
or as a "license tax"?
Power to Levy an "Income Tax"
Section 11 of article XIII of the California Constitution provides:
Income taxes may be assessed to and collected from persons, cor-
porations, joint stock associations, or companies resident or doing
business in the State, or any one or more of them, in such cases and
amounts, and in such manner, as shall be prescribed by law.
Section 13 of article XIII gives the legislature power "to pass all laws
necessary to carry out the provisions of this article." Pursuant to this
authority, the legislature in 1935 enacted a comprehensive scheme of
income tax legislation. Included in this legislation is a provision37
prohibiting the levy of an "income tax" by any municipality. Section
17041.5 of the Revenue and Taxation Code states:
Notwithstanding any statute, ordinance, regulation, rule or deci-
sion to the contrary, no city, county, city and county, governmental
subdivision... whether chartered or not, shall levy... any tax upon
the income, or any part thereof, of any person, resident or nonresident.
That the legislative intent is to prohibit the levy on an "income tax" is
quite clear. Section 17041.5 further reads:
This section shall not be construed so as to prohibit the levy or
collection of any otherwise authorized license tax upon a business
measured by or according to gross receipts.
Under the principles of constitutional home rule, the validity of a
municipal "income tax" would depend on judicial willingness to in-
clude in the municipal power to tax for revenue purposes the power
to levy "income taxes" as well as "license taxes." The effectiveness of
the legislative prohibition of a municipal "income tax" is uncertain
without judicial interpretation and construction of the constitutional
provision involved. The purpose of section 11 of article XIII was to
provide for a special and distinct form of taxation since, under the
California constitution, if "income taxes" were deemed to be taxes on
income, as property, a graduated income tax would be unconstitu-
tional.38 What the section accomplished was to provide for the consti-
30 Howard v. Commissioners of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624, 629 (1953)
(Louisville occupation tax measured by earnings or profits held to be an
"income tax" for the purposes of the Buck Act); Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky.
420, 214 S.W.2d 248 (1948) (the Louisville occupation tax was not an "in-
come tax" within the meaning of the Kentucky Constitution); Dole v. Phil-
adelphia, 337 Pa. 375, 11 A.2d 163 (1940) (similar measure held to be an
"income tax"). But cf. Carter Carburetor Corp. v. St. Louis, 356 Mo. 646, 653,
203 S.W.2d 438, 440 (1947).
37 CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE §§ 17001-19500.
38 Traynor & Keesling, The Scope and Nature of the California Income
Tax, 24 CALi. L. REV. 502-04 (1936).
tutionality of "income taxes" in California.39 Section 11 does not, by
its express terms, prohibit the levy of "income taxes" by municipalities
and hence, the charter city could be deemed to have the power within
the home rule grant.40
That this would be the judicial determination of a municipal "income
tax", however, seems highly unlikely. The constitutional authority,
the comprehensiveness of the state legislation and the legislative in-
tent combine to form strong opposition to what would be, in effect, an
expansion of the presently operative and judicially determined power
of municipal taxation by the inclusion within it of the power to impose
"income taxes."
"Income Tax" or "License Tax"?
Judicial classification of taxing measures is predicated upon the
uniformly accepted rule that the character of any given tax will be
determined from its incidents and from the natural and legal effect
of the language used.41 A "license tax" is directed against the right
to dispose of property, to pursue a business, occupation or calling, or
to exercise a privilege.42 An "income tax" is directed against the
acquisitions of the taxpayer arising from many sources including the
pursuit of an occupation, trade or calling.43
The plain meaning of the language of the commuter tax ordinance
is to impose a license fee on the privilege of employment. The extent
to which the privilege will be taxed is measured by gross earnings, but
the measure of the tax does not determine its character. Thus, a
privilege tax does not become a property tax simply because it is pro-
portioned in amount to the value of the property used in connection
with the privilege that is taxed.44 A corporation franchise tax does
39 Id. at 505-06.
40 See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text. Further support for its
reluctance to limit municipal taxing power was found by the court by refer-
ence to other constitutional provisions: "Where the power of taxation has
been lodged in the state to the exclusion of municipalities and other entities
of that character, it has customarily been done by specific language expres-
sive of such purpose .... Thus in 1933 .. .there were two amendments to
article XIII, sections 14 and 16, vesting an exclusive power of taxation in the
state over "insurance companies" and "banks" respectively, by expressly
providing it to be "in lieu of all other taxes .... " Ainsworth v. Bryant,
34 Cal. 2d 465, 472, 211 P.2d 564, 568 (1949).
41 Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 255 U.S. 288, 292
(1931); Douglas Aircraft v. Johnson, 13 Cal. 2d 545, 550, 90 P.2d 572,
575 (1939); Ingels v. Riley, 5 Cal. 2d 154, 159, 53 P.2d 939, 942 (1936).
42 See Ingels v. Riley, 5 Cal. 2d 154, 157, 53 P.2d 939, 942 (1936).
43 Poorman v. State Bd. of Equalization, 99 Mont. 543, 554, 45 P.2d 307,
312 (1935).
44 Ingels v. Riley, 5 Cal. 2d 154, 160, 53 P.2d 939, 942 (1936). South
Coast Fisheries, Inc. v. Department of Fish & Game, 213 Cal. App. 2d 325,
330, 28 Cal. Rptr. 537, 540, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 57 (1963) (failure to
state a federal question).
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not become an income tax because it is measured by net income.45
In Franklin v. Peterson46 a gross receipts occupation tax was
challenged by an attorney on the ground that the city had no legal
authority to impose a license tax on occupations licensed by the state.
The court pointed out that the occupation tax was levied on the busi-
ness of practicing law rather than on the person because he was an
attorney,47 and the further contention that the occupation tax was an
"income tax" was summarily dismissed:
A long line of decisions rendered in this state has sustained the valid-
ity of gross receipts taxes, and furthermore a gross receipts occupation
tax is not an income tax.48
The contention must be met that the ordinance is worded as a
license tax in order to avoid the absence of power to impose an income
tax.49 But because of the numerous California decisions sustaining
occupation and privilege taxes, there is little likelihood that the
language of the ordinance will be disregarded in order to sustain a
contention of subterfuge."
Municipal Affairs
In the context of what has been said thus far, a narrow question
presents itself: Has there been a change in California in the judicial
approach to municipal home rule that would permit the court to en-
croach upon the "absolute power of taxation" doctrine so as to in-
validate the commuter tax ordinace?
The cases are consistent in carefully pointing out that the initial
determination of the validity of a chartered city's legislation turns on
whether the subject matter is a municipal affair.51 Since the con-
stitution fails to define the term, it has been for the courts to make
the determination of what is a municipal affair, predicated on the
facts and circumstances of each case. 52 The term has been narrowly
45 Rosemary Properties, Inc. v. McColgan, 29 Cal. 2d 677, 681, 177 P.2d
757, 760 (1947).
40 87 Cal. App. 2d 727, 197 P.2d 788 (1948).
47 Id. at 731, 197 P.2d at 790.
48 Id. at 733, 197 P.2d at 792.
49 On September 13, 1968, the counties of Alameda, Contra Costa, Main,
San Mateo and Santa Clara filed a complaint for injunction and declaratory
relief in the Sonoma County Superior Court. The argument is made that the
tax is an income tax in the guise of a license tax. Points and Authorities for
Plaintiff at 7-9, Alameda County v. San Francisco, No. 60398 (Super. Ct.,
Sonoma County, Cal., Sept. 13, 1968). The followhig are included as incidents
of an income tax: (1) It is directed at persons, not employment; (2) it is
measured by income; (3) it is a substantial burden and nonresident employees
earning less than $4000.00 annually are excluded. Id. at 8.
50 E.g., West Coast Advertising Co. v .San Francisco, 14 Cal. 2d 516, 95
P.2d 138 (1939); Ingels v. Riley, 5 Cal. 2d 154, 53 P.2d 939 (1936).
51 E.g., Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. San Francisco, 51 Cal. 2d 766, 767, 336
P.2d 514, 515 (1959).
52 In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 128, 396 P.2d 809, 814, 41 Cal. Rptr.
construed and repeatedly modified with such words as "strictly,"5'
"internal 54 and "exclusively."55  The concept is not based on any
fixed rules; it changes as conditions change. In 1959, the California
Supreme Court, in overruling a District Court of Appeal decision5 6
that had sustained the maintenance of poles, wires and other tele-
phone equipment as a municipal affair, had this to say:
[T]he constitutional concept of municipal affairs is not a fixed or
static quantity. It changes with the changing conditions upon which
it is to operate. What may at one time have been a matter of local
concern may at a later time become a matter of state concern con-
trolled by the general laws of the state.57
Although the exercise of municipal taxing power has consistently
been construed as a "strictly .. .municipal affair, '58 the levying of
the tax on nonresidents to the exclusion of residents brings into play
this "changing concept of municipal affairs." The state legislature has
clearly indicated that it considers this tax to be a matter of statewide
concern. In July, 1968, section 50026 was added to the Government
Code:
The legislative body of any local agency, chartered or general law,
which is otherwise authorized ... to impose any tax on the privilege
of earning a livelihood by an employee ... shall not impose any such
tax ... when such employee is not a resident of the taxing jurisdic-
tion, unless the same tax... at the same rate ... is imposed on the
earnings of all residents of the taxing jurisdiction who are employed
therein.
Under the principles of home rule, it is obvious that this legisla-
tion is not effective to preclude San Francisco from levying the com-
muter tax. It is effective, however, to show that the state considers
the commuter tax to be a matter of interest to it and not a matter
exclusively of municipal concern. A further provision indicates that
the commuter tax ordinance offends state policy:
The Legislature finds and declares that the right of citizens of
California to move freely about the state in search of employment
is a matter of statewide interest and concern. Any unnecessary bar-
riers which impede the mobility of citizens of this state or limit their
choice of employment are contrary to state policy. An occupation tax
393, 398 (1964); Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276,
294, 384 P.2d 158, 169, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 840 (1963); Redwood City v. Moore,
231 Cal. App. 2d 563, 577, 42 Cal. Rptr. 72, 82 (1965).
53 E.g., In re Novak 184 Cal. 701, 704, 195 P. 402, 403 (1921).
54 E.g., Wilton v. Henkin, 52 Cal. App. 2d 368, 372, 126 P.2d 425, 427
(1942).
55 E.g., Simpson v. Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 2d 271, 277-78, 253 P.2d 464,
468 (1953).
56 San Diego v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 793, 208 P.2d 27
(1949).
57 Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. San Francisco, 51 Cal. 2d 766, 771, 336 P.2d
514, 517 (1959).
58 Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34 Cal. 2d 465, 469, 211 P.2d 564, 566 (1949);
accord, West Coast Advertising Co. v. San Francisco, 14 Cal. 2d 516, 524, 95
P.2d 138, 143 (1939).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20
January 1969] SAN FRANCISCO'S COMMUTER TAX 821
on employees measured by income which is not borne equally by resi-
dents and nonresidents of a taxing jurisdiction would be such a bar-
rier.5 9
Should the court agree, it has the discretion to determine that this
particular taxing measure is not a municipal affair. The California
Supreme Court has taken judicial notice of the rapid growth of subur-
ban areas in California and the high rate of mobility of the citizens
of the state.60 The "commuter," as a member of these suburban com-
munities, can certainly be deemed a subject of statewide rather than
local concern. But to make the determination that a taxing ordinance
for the purpose of raising revenue is not a municipal affair would be
a radical departure from previous decisions. The more likely result is
that the court will find the commuter tax ordinance invalid by apply-
ing to it the principles of preemption.
The Preemption Doctrine
The constitutional provisions relating to charter and general law
cities are not identical in their terminology. The charter city, in mat-
ters that are not municipal affairs, is "subject to" the general laws.61
The general law city is limited to "all such local, police, sanitary and
other regulations as are not in conflict with the general laws.16 2 It is
from the "conflict with the general laws" that the doctrine of pre-
emption has evolved.6 3  Under these provisions, the doctrine is
brought into play when a general law city creates a conflict by at-
tempting to legislate regarding a subject upon which the state has
already acted. The conflict is resolved in favor of the state when the
state legislation expressly prohibits what an ordinance authorizes, or
shows an intent to "occupy the field."6 4
The doctrine of preemption is not applicable, however, to a charter
city ordinance on a subject matter that is not a municipal affair.65
When the subject is of statewide concern, there is no question of con-
flict, and the city is subject to the state law.66 This distinction is
subscribed to by the supreme court, but its application is limited to
revenue raising measures. As to ordinances enacted for purposes of
regulation, the doctrine of preemption, in effect, has operated to
eliminate any real distinction between charter and general law cities.
59 Cal. Stats. 1968, ch. 559, § 3, at 1014, adding CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50026
(emphasis added).
60 In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 111, 372 P.2d 897, 904, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 864
(1962) (concurring opinion).
61 CAL. CONST. art. X, § 6.
62 Id. art. XI, § 11.
63 Comment, The California City versus Preemption by Implication, 17
HAsTNGs L.J. 604 (1966).
64 Id. at 605.
65 In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 127, 396 P.2d 809, 814, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393,
398 (1964).
66 Id.
For example, in Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles,67 the point in issue was whether the state legislation re-
lating to the organizational rights of fire fighters was binding on
a charter city. The court was careful to point out that the only
question was whether the subject matter of the state legislation was
or was not a municipal affair; the doctrine of preemption clearly being
inapplicable.6 8 The court further concluded, however, that the deter-
mination of what is or is not a municipal affair was to be made not
only from the facts and circumstances of each case, but from the "legis-
lative purpose in each individual instance."6 9  The state legislation
was found to be so extensive and its purpose so clear as to require the
conclusion that labor relations were exclusively a matter of state con-
cern. The charter city, although it retained control of the fire depart-
ment as such, was held to be without authority to act at all on the
rights of the firemen to organize or join a union.
But if what is or is not a municipal affair is to be determined on
the basis of prior state action and legislative intent, the legislature
does, in effect, "confer, modify or withdraw" 70 the power of a charter
city over municipal affairs granted by the constitution. The careful,
analytical approach to the chartered cities becomes, fundamentally, a
technical differentiation affecting only the court's initial evaluation
of the issues. The outcome is determined from the principles of
preemption. Further support for this statement is found in two recent
cases, In re Hubbard71 and In re Lane.7 2
In Hubbard, the supreme court dealt with the problem of state
and municipal control in the area of gambling regulation. The basic
preemption doctrine of "intent to occupy the field" was applied, and
in this instance it was held that the state legislation did not show an
intent to occupy the whole field. The ordinance, therefore, was a
valid exercise of municipal police power. The court then went on to
try to clarify, without expressly discarding, the distinction between
the application of the doctrine of preemption to a general law city and
the determination of "municipal affairs" of a charter city, pointing
out that "occupation of the field, may itself become a test, though not
the sole test, of whether it is or is not a municipal affair."7 3 The court,
however, set down guidelines which clearly open the door to the ap-
plication of the doctrine of preemption in any determination of mu-
nicipal affairs.
The question must be answered in the light of the facts and circum-
67 60 Cal. 2d 276, 384 P.2d 158, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1963).
68 Id. at 292 n.11, 384 P.2d at 168 n.11, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 840 n.11.
69 Id. at 294, 384 P.2d at 169, 32 Cal. at 841.
70 Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 211, 74 P. 780, 783 (1903). See note 29
supra and accompanying text.
71 62 Cal. 2d 119, 396 P.2d 809, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1964).
72 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1962).
73 In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 127, 396 P.2d 809, 814, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393,
398 (1964).
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stances surrounding each case. This does not mean that there are no
standards which a chartered city or county may apply when attempt-
ing to determine its right to legislate in a specific field. Analysis of
many prior decisions on this subject indicates that although the lan-
guage differs from case to case, the rationale of all have one thing in
common, that is, the chartered counties and cities have full power to
legislate in regard to municipal affairs unless: (1) the subject mat-
ter has been so fully covered by the general law as to clearly indicate
that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern: (2) the sub-
ject matter has been partially covered by general law couched in such
terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not
tolerate further or additional action: or (3) the subject matter has
been partially covered by general law, and the subject is of such a
nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient
citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit to the municipal-
ity.74
In re Lane75 invalidated a Los Angeles ordinance dealing with
adult consenting sexual behavior and, in so doing, extended the doc-
trine of preemption to include preemption by implication: "A com-
prehensive and detailed general scheme, with respect to a subject,
serves, without more, to occupy the field to the exclusion of local
regulation."76
It is not suggested that the doctrine of these cases will, ipso facto,
be applied to an ordinance dealing with a tax measure for revenue
purposes. Regulatory and taxing measures are distinctly separate
subject matters and no California decision thus far has applied the
doctrine of preemption to an ordinance levying a tax for revenue pur-
poses. But the cases do stand for the proposition that not only will the
courts, as they traditionally have, decide whether the subject matter
is a municipal affair from the facts and circumstances of each case,77
but the facts and circumstances will also determine whether state
action will be applied as the determinative factor. Under this ap-
proach it would not be a radical departure for the courts to find
that the "plenary power of taxation possessed by a chartered munici-
pality"78 does not include a tax levied exclusively on commuters. Fol-
lowing the Hubbard79 classification, the ordinance fits quite neatly
into the second category. The subject matter is partially covered
by the general law of income taxation, 0 and the paramount state
concern is clearly evident.81
The substantially extraterritorial effect of the ordinance operates
to withdraw the measure from the traditional concepts of municipal
affairs. Although the taxable event occurs within the city of San
74 Id. at 128, 396 P.2d at 814-15, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 398-99 (emphasis added).
75 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1962).
76 Id. at 109, 372 P.2d at 903, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
77 See cases cited note 52 supra.
78 Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34 Cal. 2d 465, 472, 211 P.2d 564, 568 (1949).
79 In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 128, 396 P.2d 809, 814-15, 41 Cal. Rptr.
393, 398-99.
80 CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE §§ 17001-19500.
81 Cal. Stats. 1968, ch. 559 at 1014, adding CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50026.
Francisco, its infringement on the interests of the neighboring cities
whose residents pay the tax is evident.8 2 The State Legislature has
clearly enunciated its opposition to the tax measure.8 3 A judicial
evaluation of the ordinance will, of necessity, give consideration to the
attitude of the legislature since it reflects matters of statewide con-
cern. If, in balancing conflicting interests, the court should deter-
mine that the tax is a detriment to the well-being of the state, the
ordinance will be invalid whether the court chooses to declare it so on
the basis of paramount state concern or on the basis of preemption.
Equal Protection
Should the determination be made that under the constitutional
grant of home rule San Francisco has the power to levy this tax,
another constitutional problem will have to be faced. This problem
involves no jurisdictional question. The power of a sovereign political
entity to tax includes a tax on nonresidents on property owned and
income earned within its physical boundaries.8 4 Insofar as the meas-
ure levies a tax on earnings of nonresident employees, it is a discrim-
inatory measure and, as such, raises the issue of whether it contra-
venes the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and
the comparable section of the California Constitution. 5
Residence-Interstate Discrimination
Where residence is the equivalent of citizenship, it cannot be
made the basis for discriminatory legislation. In Travis v. Yale &
Towne Manufacturing Company,"8 the United States Supreme Court
invalidated a New York income tax law which discriminated against
nonresidents employed in New York by allowing exemptions to resi-
dents. Because of the proximity of New York to Connecticut and
New Jersey, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that "nonresi-
dents" would, as a matter of practical necessity, include citizens of
other states who, under article IV, section 2 of the Constitution, were
82 From 187,000 to 200,000 residents of neighboring cities will be affected
by the imposition of the commuter tax. The ordinance refers to 187,600.
San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance 246-68, Aug. 19, 1968. Complaint for Injunc-
tion and Declaratory Relief at 2, Alameda County v. San Francisco, No. 60398,
(Super. Ct., Sonoma County, Cal. Sept. 13, 1968) refers to 200,000 persons.
83 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50026.
84 Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 54 (1920); Arnke v. Berkeley, 185 Cal.
App. 2d 842, 847, 8 Cal. Rptr. 645, 648 (1960).
85 CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 21: "[N]or shall any citizen, or class of citizens,
be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be
granted to all citizens." This section has consistently been interpreted as
having the same effect as the equal protection clause of the federal Consti-
tution. See, e.g., Fox Bakersfield Theatre Corp. v. Bakersfield, 36 Cal. 2d 136,
222 P.2d 879 (1950).
86 252 U.S. 60, 79 (1920).
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entitled to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by the citizens
of New York.
Similarly, in Toomer v. Witsell,87 a South Carolina statute im-
posing a $25 license fee on shrimp boats owned by residents of the
state and a $2500 fee on nonresident owners was held to be unconsti-
tutional. The Court pointed out that article IV, section 2 does not
preclude disparity of treatment where there are valid, independent
reasons for it other than residence.88 But in discerning what would
be a valid, independent reason, the Court had this to say:
Nothing in the record indicates that non-residents use larger boats or
different fishing methods than residents, that the cost of enforcing the
laws against them is appreciably greater, or that any substantial
amount of the State's general funds is devoted to shrimp conserva-
tion. But assuming such were the facts, they would not necessarily
support a remedy so drastic as to be a near equivalent to total ex-
clusion.8 9
The same reasoning applied in these holdings is encompassed by
the equal protection clause. But the rationale of federalism under-
lying the Constitution gives added implementation to decisions in-
volving discrimination against nonresidents. Thus, in Wheeling Steel
Corporation v. Glander,90 the court struck down, as violating equal
protection, an Ohio tax measure that discriminated against nonresi-
dents; whereas, in Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc., v. Bowers,9' another
provision of the Ohio tax law, discriminating in favor of nonresidents,
was held not to be offensive to the principles of equal protection on
the ground that state policy of encouraging business location within
the state was a valid basis for discrimination. Mr. Justice Brennan
in a concurring opinion, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, distinguished
the two decisions on the principles of federalism:
• . .'Wheeling applied the Equal Protection Clause to give effect to its
role to protect our federalism by denying Ohio the power constitu-
tionally to discriminate in favor of its own residents against the resi-
dents of other state members of our federation. On the other hand,
in the present case, Ohio's classification based on residence operates
against Ohio residents and clearly presents no state action disruptive of
the federal pattern .... [A] rational basis [state policy] can be
found for this exercise by Ohio of the latitude permitted it to define
classifications under the Equal Protection Clause.92
Although the San Francisco ordinance fails to define nonresidents,
a court would undoubtedly take judicial notice of the fact that non-
resident persons engaged in occupations, trades and professions
would not, as a matter of practical necessity, include citizens of other
states. The "commuter" in San Francisco. resides in adjoining coun-
ties. Thus, the holdings of Travis"3 and Toomer94 are not directly
87 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
88 Id. at 396.
89 Id. at 398.
90 337 U.S. 562 (1949).
91 358 U.S. 522 (1959).
92 Id. at 533.
93 Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
94 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
applicable to the commuter tax ordinance. In this connection, it
should be noted that the privileges and immunities clause of the four-
teenth amendment is not deemed to operate on intrastate action.95
Although the California Legislature has reiterated the policy under-
lying the privileges and immunities clause,96 this is a matter of state
policy and not of constitutional mandate.97 Thus, aside from the
California provisions concerning municipalities, the only state or fed-
eral constitutional question the ordinance raises is that of equal pro-
tection under the laws. Residence is at issue only to the extent it
raises the question of unconstitutional classification.
Intrastate Discrimination
The equal protection problem posed by the ordinance is fre-
quently referred to by the courts in terms of "subclassification"."
The commuter tax measure divides a constitutionally recognized
group 99 -i.e., employees-into resident and nonresident employees and
levies the tax only on nonresidents. In the narrowest interpretation
of arbitrary classification this, without justification, is clearly uncon-
stitutional.100 The justification offered is that the commuter, in ex-
ercising his privilege of employment in San Francisco, uses city ser-
vices provided with revenue derived from San Francisco residents.101
The narrow question presented is: Does this justification, under
equal protection principles, make a patently arbitrary classification,
constitutionally acceptable?
In Louisville Gas and Electric Company v. Coleman,02 the United
States Supreme Court considered the problem of subclassification.
95 Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1939), overruling Colgate v. Har-
vey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935). In Colgate a Vermont tax provision that discrim-
inated against state residents by a differential tax treatment of income earned
within the state was held to violate the privileges and immunities clause of
the 14th amendment.
96 Cal. Stats. 1968, ch. 559, § 3 at 1014, adding CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50026.
For the language of this provision, see text accompanying note 59 supra.
97 See note 85 supra.
98 E.g., Gowans v. Bakersfield, 179 Cal. App. 2d 282, 285, 3 Cal. Rptr.
746, 749 (1960)
99 See Walters v. St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954).
100 If no reasonably justifiable subclassification is or can be made, the
operation of the tax must be such as to place liability therefor equally on all
members of the group. Fox Bakersfield Theatre Corp. v. Bakersfield, 36 Cal.
2d 136, 142, 272 P.2d 879, 883-84 (1950); Barker Bros. v. Los Angeles, 10 Cal.
2d 603, 607, 76 P.2d 97, 99 (1938); Los Angeles v. Lamkersheim, 160 Cal. 800,
802, 118 P. 215, 216-17 (1911).
101 San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance 246-68, preamble, Aug. 19, 1968:
'WHEREAS, The Board of Supervisors finds that non-residents employed by
others in San Francisco have not heretofore paid for the services furnished by
the taxpayers of San Francisco which such non-residents enjoy."
102 277 U.S. 32 (1928).
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A Kentucky revenue measure imposing a tax on the privilege of re-
cording mortgages was attacked on the ground that it violated equal
protection. The tax was levied only on debts secured by mortgages
that did not mature within five years. The Court recognized the
wide range and flexibility available to the state in classification for
tax purposes but pointed out that classification, to escape constitu-
tional objections,
must always rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable andjust relation to the act in respect to which the classification is pro-
posed, and can never be made arbitrarily and without any such
basis.' 0 3
The subclassification into short and long term loans was held to
be unconstitutional:
[O]ne is compelled to pay a tax for the enjoyment of a necessary
privilege which.., is furnished to another as a pure gratuity. Such
classification is arbitrary. It bears no reasonable or just relation to
the intended result of the legislation .... [T] o exact, as the price of
a privilege which, for obvious reasons, neither can safely forego, a tax
from the latter [long term loans] not imposed in any degree upon the
former produces an obvious and gross inequality. 0 4
This holding is clearly applicable to the commuter tax ordinance.
No one could argue that the privilege of employment is a less "neces-
sary" privilege than that of recording mortgages. The nonresident
employee is, without question, exercising a "necessary privilege" upon
which he is taxed and from which his fellow employee who is a resi-
dent of San Francisco is entirely exempt. The obvious rebuttal to
this which the ordinance suggests is that the privilege is not afforded
to San Francisco residents as a "mere gratuity" because they are sub-
ject to other forms of taxation. But the reasoning in Louisville'0 5
incorporates two basic principles of constitutional classification which
make it clear that such a contention is not sustainable. (1) The wide
latitude in classification for tax purposes is limited by the require-
ment that a valid reason relating to the classification must exist for
the court to sustain unlike treatment of persons similarly circum-
stanced.10 6 (2) Although a differential treatment may be sustainable
under the broad power of classification for taxing purposes, a degree
of disparity so great as to impose a tax on some members of a group
and no tax on others similarly circumstanced, is clearly unconstitu-
tional.107
Justification Offered by the Ordinance
To accomplish its purpose of easing the city budget, the commuter
tax ordinance arbitrarily singles out nonresident employees to pay
for services furnished by San Francisco taxpayers and enjoyed by
103 Id. at 37, quoting Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897).
104 Id. at 38, 39 (emphasis added).
105 Note 102 supra.
100 See note 103 supra, and accompanying text.
107 See note 104 supra, and accompanying text.
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nonresidents, excluding all other nonresidents who are not employees
and enjoy these services, as well as all nonresident employees who
earn less than $4000 a year.108 The ordinance then integrates into a
mathematical formula the total income earned in San Francisco, 0 9 the
cost to the city of public services" 0 and the percentage of commuters
to residents,"' applying the resulting quotient to the income earned
by nonresident employees."
2
The arbitrariness of the measure is emphasized by this formula.
First, if the purpose, as stated, is to pay for services enjoyed, a sound
mathematical basis would be occupancy in the city. The time spent
in the city by the commuter has a direct relationship to the services
he uses. The percentage of commuter employees to the total resident
population of San Francisco is not a valid mathematical unit to deter-
mine an apportionment of costs.
Secondly, the source of revenue to pay for these services is pri-
marily in the form of property taxes." 3 This form of taxation is a
concomitant of residence, not of employment. To relieve the property
tax burden of the San Francisco resident by taxing the nonresident
employee is grossly unfair since the commuter, as a concomitant of
residence, pays property taxes in the community in which he lives
either as a result of a direct levy on his home or indirectly through the
payment of rent. Regardless of this fact, the general proposition that
the payment of property taxes is a valid basis for classification is, in
any event, negated by a series of California cases dealing with business
licensing in which the payment of property taxes has a far more di-
rect relationship to the subject matter of the classification than can
be found in the commuter tax ordinance.
108 San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance 246-68, § 2, Aug. 19, 1968.
109 Id. preamble: "Whereas, adjusted gross income in the form of wages
and salaries earned in San Francisco ... allocated to commuters is $1,267,-
000,000 out of a total of $2,721,000,000;"
110 Id.: "Whereas . . . the 1967-68 budget . . .included services to both
residents and non-residents at a cost of $69,623,508 . .. ."
'11 Id.: "Whereas, A survey . . .showed 187,600 commuters working in
San Francisco."
112 Id.: "Whereas, This Board of Supervisors finds that the adjusted gross
income in the form of wages and salaries is an equitable factor upon which
the commuter should pay his fair share of services .... "
113 Sho Sato, Municipal Occupation Taxes in California: The Authority
to Levy Taxes and the Burden on Intrastate Commerce, 53 CALIn. L. REv. 802
(1965). Letter from Mayor Joseph Alioto to the Board of Supervisors, Mar.
20, 1968, on file Board of Supervisors, Clerk's Office, File No. 238-68-5. This
letter in reference to the Mayor's 1968 tax proposals indicates San Francisco's
revenue problems: "Last year's [1967] abrupt shift of $29,000,000.00 from
business to homeowners created hardship for many San Franciscans. The
shift intensified the already heavy burden of property taxes .... [O]ver-
reliance on the property tax is hard on both the taxpayers and city govern-
ment. . . ." Id.
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The foundation case is Ex parte Ha-skell, 114 in which a differential
license tax as to merchants with or without a fixed place of business
was sustained. The court reasoned that, although the ordinance dis-
criminated between classes engaged in the same general business, the
methods of doing business were essentially dissimilar. Underlying
this determination was a judicial recognition that the costs of con-
ducting a local business included the payment of taxes and other
municipal charges from which the itinerant vendor was excluded and
that the property taxes were paid in furtherance of the business which
was being licensed.
This distinction in the mode of doing business has been broad
enough to allow discrimination between businesses located within the
city and those located outside. Thus, in Continental Baking Company
v. City of Escondido,"15 a municipal ordinance imposing a license tax
of $50.00 on bakeries located within the city and $150.00 on bakeries
located outside the city, was sustained by the court of appeal. Conti-
nental seemingly enlarged Haskell to include, as a basis for differen-
tial taxation, the payment of property taxes by the fixed place of
business:
Persons conducting bakeries within the City of Escondido are obliged
to pay an ad valorem tax to the city on the real and personal prop-
erty devoted to their businesses. Those engaged in the bakery busi-
ness elsewhere pay no such tax to the City of Escondido. This fact
alone furnishes sufficient justification for imposing a greater license
fee upon the latter class.116
But in Silversten v. City of Menlo Park,1 7 the supreme court met
and rejected the contention that this was the Continental holding:
[T]he appellant attempts to distinguish this case on the ground that
the statute [in Continental] expressly stated that the local businesses,
to pay only the lower fee, were to be on the tax rolls of the city ....
[A]ny such provision may be considered mere surplusage.il8
Insofar as Continental was not overruled, its reference to prop-
erty taxes must be taken as dictum. The basis of classification, for the
purpose of imposing license taxes in differing amounts remains the
different mode of doing business. The law must be taken to be that
the payment of property taxes is not a constitutionally acceptable
basis of classification. As "mere surplusage," the justification offered
by the commuter tax does not obviate its arbitrary classification.
Degree of Disparity
Equal protection does not demand an absolute equality of treat-
ment in classifying for tax purposes." 9 If the disparity is not too
114 112 Cal. 412, 44 P. 725 (1896).
115 21 Cal. App. 2d 388, 69 P.2d 181 (1937).
116 Id. at 393, 69 P.2d at 183.
117 17 Cal. 2d 197, 109 P.2d 928 (1941).
118 Id. at 202, 109 P.2d at 931. (emphasis added).
119 E.g., State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 537 (1931).
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great an unusual or questionable classification may be sustained. 20
But the San Francisco ordinance in levying a tax on the privilege of
employment and imposing a tax on some members of the class thus
created, and no tax on others, evidences a degree of disparity that
the courts will not sustain.
For example, in Bueneman v. City of Santa Barbara,12 1 an ordi-
nance imposing a $200 yearly license fee on laundries that were doing
business in the city but whose plants were located outside and no fee
on laundries with local plants was struck down. The supreme court,
recognizing differential treatment of similar businesses, defined its
limits:
[TIhe right to make such distinctions is not broad enough to allow a
municipality to tax persons doing a particular kind of business within
the city and to entirely exempt other persons doing essentially the
same kind of business in essentially the same way.22
Similarly, in an early case,12 3 the supreme court, in invalidating
an ordinance subclassifying office buildings by size, enunciated the
principle in unequivocal terms:
The legislature has absolutely no power to classify persons, natural or
artificial, engaged in precisely the same occupation, laying a tax upon
some of them and excepting others ... . This ordinance, therefore,
is unjust and discriminatory in... imposmg upon a class artificially
created, a burden not imposed upon all who stand in the same rela-
tion to the same subject matter.2 4
The degree of disparity and the necessity of a reasonable relation
between the justification and the classification are overlapping doc-
trines. They combine in the commuter tax ordinance to result in a
discriminatory classification that is arbitrarily directed against non-
resident persons employed in San Francisco.
Conclusion
The levy of the commuter tax is not a valid exercise of municipal
power to tax. The extraterritorial thrust of the ordinance offends
the traditional meaning of municipal affairs, which carries with it
the concept of a city functioning as a sovereign entity only within its
physical boundaries. To the extent that it is levied only on nonresi-
dents it operates without the built-in considerations of over-all results
inherent in any legislation affecting the voting members of a political
body. The interests and problems of the persons against whom the
tax is directed are of no concern to the taxing authority; nor do the
commuters have any voice directly or indirectly in the imposition or
administration of the measure. A judicial determination, under these
120 Silversten v. Menlo Park 17 Cal. 2d 197, 201-02, 109 P.2d 928, 930-31
(1941).
121 8 Cal. 2d 405, 65 P.2d 884 (1937).
122 Id. at 411, 65 P.2d at 888 (emphasis added).
123 Los Angeles v. Lankersheim, 160 Cal. 800, 118 P. 215 (1911).
124 Id. at 804, 118 P.2d at 217 (emphasis added).
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facts, that the "commuter" is a matter of statewide concern would be
manifestly just.
Under the safeguards of equal protection, the measure is stripped
of its prima facie reasonableness and is revealed to discriminate un-
constitutionally against nonresidents in favor of residents.
The commuter tax ordinance is an unfortunate choice of vehicle
in which to launch a solution to the critical "source of revenue" prob-
lem of the municipality.
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